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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
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S. W. DOWSE,

vs.
FRED D. KAMMERMAN and
VAUGHN D. KAMMERMAN,

CASE NO. 7719

doing business as KAMMERMAN COMPANY,

Appellants.

Brief of Appellants

DAVID A.' WEST,

Attorney for Appellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
S.

,V.

DOWSE,

Respondent,

vs.
FRED D. KAMMERMAN and
VAUGHN D. KAMMERMAN,

CASE NO. 7719

doing business as KAMMERMAN COMPANY,

Appellants.

Brief of Appellants
STATEMENT OF FACTS

S. W. Dowse, plaintiff and respondent, hereinafter called Respondent, instituted an action in the
District Court of the State of Utah in and for Salt
Lake County, against defendants and appellants,
hereinafter called Appellants, to quiet title to Lot 7,
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Block 1, Holland Subdivision, Salt Lake County, Utah,
using the short form of complaint; to which Appellants filed an answer and cross complaint. In its
answer Appellants alleged ownership in fee, and
possession, and denied Respondent's claim; and as
a further and separate defense, Appellants pleaded
equitable estoppel, setting out facts which they claim
constitute equitable estoppel of Respondent. In its
cross complaint, Appellants pleaded quiet title, using
the simple form of complaint.
At the trial of the case, the matters were submitted to the court, sitting without a jury, on an
Agreed Statement of Facts, to which was attached
as Exhibit A, a tax report for the year 1930, and also
an abstract of title extended to March 28, 1951.
These are a part of the designated record on appeal.
The fact on which Appellants rely, as recited
in the said Agreed Statement of Facts, are briefly as
follows:
One Charles E. Pittorf acquired the fee title to
the property February 26, 1907. General taxes were
paid each year to and including the year 1929. The
taxes were not paid for 1930, and in due course the
Treasurer of Salt Lake County executed a tax sale
thereon, dated December 22, 1930, to Salt Lake
County, a municipal corporation. Thereafter, general taxes were added for the years 1931 to 1935,
inclusive, amounting to $49.99 in all; and under
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date of March 31, 1936, Auditor's tax deed issued to
Salt Lake County, a municipal corporation.
Some nine years later, Salt Lake County sold
the property to S. W. Dowse, Respondent herein,
dated April 2+, 19+5, under authority of Title 80,
Chapter 1O, Section 68, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
(See page 26 of abstract); and on June 13, 1945, S.
W. Dowse, Respondent, and his wife, Pearl B. Dowse,
sold said premises to Doris Trust Company, a Utah
Corporation, Appellants' immediate predecessor
in interest, conveying by quitclaim deed; which corporation went into immediate possession, and such
possession has continued to date of decree herein;
that Appellants and their said predecessor in interest
paid the general taxes on said property for the years
1946 to and including 1949, four years, in the total
amount of $10.61, and paid special assessment thereon levied by Salt Lake City, in the sum of $93.04.
While the consideration paid by Appellants for
said property to said Doris Trust Company is not
mentioned in the Agreed Statement of Facts, revenue
stamps attached (page 28 of abstract) show a consideration of $1000.00.
From probate proceedings filed in 1950 in Salt
Lake County, it appears that Charles E. Pittorf died
July 12, 1912, leaving surviving him his widow and
one daughter, both residing at the time in the State
of Montana. On March 14, 1950, May G. Pittorf~ the
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widow, executed a quit claim deed to said property to
Respondent, for the consideration of $25.00, and on
March 23, 1950, Grace P. Myers, the daughter of deceased, executed a quit claim deed to Respondent for
$10.00. Respondent thereupon caused to be probated
the said estate of said deceased, and by virtue of said
quit claim deeds, obtained an order of distribution
to himself in said estate of said property and
promptly thereafter filed the aforementioned suit
to quiet title.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON

1. The court erred in quieting title in Respondent, and in not quieting title in Appellants.
2. The court erred in not applying the principle
of equitable estoppel against Respondent.
3. The court erred in deciding that the facts did
not constitute ground sufficient to invoke and apply
the doctrine and principle of equitable estoppel
herein.
ARGUMENTS ON QUESTIONS INVOLVED

As shown under the title "Estoppel," 19 American Jurisprudence, at p. 601, Estoppels are of three
kinds: ( 1) By Record, (2) by deed, and (3) by
matter in pais, the first two being sometimes referred
to as technical estoppels as distinguished from equitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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able estoppels or estoppels in pais; and the author
concerns himself only 'vith estoppels by deed and
estoppels in pais.
Under the discussion of Estoppel by Deed, and
the sub-heading "Effect of Quitclaim," p. 606, appears the following:
"Subject to qualification under special
factual situations, it may be stated as a general
principle that no estoppel arises from either
making or accepting a quitclaim deed, except
as to any right, title, or interest the grantor
may have had or claimed at the time of conveyance. Such generalization is in full accord
'vith the basic theory that a mere quitclaim
is created ·where a deed is only a conveyance
of the interest or title of the grantor in and
to the property described, rather than of the
property itself, and that a quitclaim passes
all the right, title, and interest which a
grantor has at the time of making the deed
which is capable of being transferred by deed,
unless a contrary intent appears, and nothing
more."
Appellants accept the foregoing statement, but
assert that in the instant case the first clause, "subject to qualifications under special factual situations,"
should apply as warranted by the special factuals
situations set forth herein.
Appellants assert, also, that the principle of
rquitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, or some application of what has been tern1ed "quasi estoppe)s"
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should be invoked in the instant case. Again quoting
from Vol. 19, American Jurisprudence, page 633:
Equitable estoppels operate in their own
field as effectually as technical estoppels do
in theirs. Since, however, the principle which
underlies equitable estoppel in its proper sense
runs throughout all the transactions and contracts of civilized life, such estoppels cannot
be subjected to fixed and settled rules of universal application, like legal estoppels, or hampered by the narrow confines of a technical
formula. In other words, each case of estoppel
must in the nature of things stand on its own
bottom."
Further,
Equitable Estopples are invoked to further
equity and justice by preventing a party from
asserting his rights under a technical rule of
law when he has so conducted himself that it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.
Grand Central Public Market v. U. S., 22 Fed.
Sup. 119.
The doctrine of Equitable Estoppel or
quasi estoppel has been extended to prevent a
wrong being done, when in good conscience
and honest dealing, a party ought not to be permitted to repudiate a previous statement, declaration, or action. Robbins v. U. S., 21 Fed.
Supp. 403.
"Estoppel" is a special plea in bar which
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happens when a man has done some act or
executed some deed which precluded him
from averring anything to the contrary, but
one \vho invokes the doctrine of estoppel must
have acted in good faith. Winston v. Saugertias Farms, 21 N.Y. Supp 2d 841.
Estoppel exists when the party sought to
be estopped, with full knowledge of all the
facts bearing on the situation, takes a position
which is inconsistent with one assumed later.
Southern Pac. v. Industrial Commission, 91
Pac. 2d. 700; 54 Ariz. 1.
Under the doctrine
quasi estoppel, regularity
procured by one himself
John H. Spohn Co. Bender,

of acquiesence or
or validity of act
cannot be raised.
64 P 2d 152.

Generally a party will not her permitted
to take a position in regard to a matter which
is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with,
one previously assumed by him. Seifner v.
vVeller, 171 S. W. 2d 617. Mo. case.
"Estoppel" means the preclusion of a person from asserting a fact by previous conduct
inconsistent therewith, on his own part or the
part of those under whom he claims, or by
adjudication on his rights, which he cannot
be allowed to call in question. Brisbon v. E. L.
Oliver Lodge No. 335 of Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 279 N. W. 277. Neb. case.
There is a species of "equitable estoppel"
sometimes called quasi estoppel, which has its
base in election, vvaiver, acquiesence or even
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acceptance of benefits, and precludes a party
from asserting to anothers disadvantage a
right inconsistent with a position previously
taken by such party, and no concealment or
misrepresentation of existing facts on one side
or ignorance thereof on the other are necessary. Montclair Trust Co. v. Russel Co. 39 A
2d 641, 135 N.J. Eq. 570.
The doctrine of quasi estoppel has its basis
in election, ratification, affirmance, acquiescense, or acceptance of benefits, and this princciple precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with
a position previously taken by him, and the
doctrine applies where it would be unconscienca ble to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced, or of which he accepted a benefit.
Fed. Land B. of Omaha v. Houck, 4 NW. 2d
213, 68 S. D. 449.
Applying the principles set out in the foregoing
to the case before the court:
Respondent purchased the real property involved, with other property, from Salt Lake County,
a municipal corporation, and received a conveyance
from said County as provided by statute. Respondent
then sold the property so purchased to Appellants'
immediate predecessor in interest for "$10.00 and
other valuable consideration"-the exact price not
being shown,-conveying by quitclaim deed (page
27 abstract).
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Section 78-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, defines "conveyance" as follows:
The term "conveyance" as used in this
title shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any real estate,
or interest in real estate, is created, aliened,
mortgaged, encumbered, or assigned, except
wills, and leases for a term of not exceeding
one year.
As stated in Pender v. R. L. Bird and Mae C. Bird,
No. 7344 in the Supreme Court of Utah, 224 Pac. 2d
105 7, the Court held, . . .
That even assuming that the tax title
from the county was defective, it gave the
defendant R. L. Bird color of title which was
clearly superior to the claim of record title
asserted by plaintiff \'vhich was shown to be
invalid. Thus, there was before the court a
plaintiff with no vestige of title and defendants
\vith color of title who '''ere in possession ....
Notwithstanding the vestige of title of Respondent, Appellants \'vere in possession of the premises
under color of title purchased from Respondent and
by reason of it, June 13, 1945; from which time
Appellants and their predecessor in interest paid
general and special taxes.
In 1950 (after a series of recisions, holdings,
among other things that failure to supply Auditor's
affidavits constituted a defprt of title), the RespondSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ent, apparently, .checked the record, found one such
affidavit missing, sought out the heirs of the former
title holder, obtained quitclaim deeds from them for
a nominal consideration, to wit, $25.00 to one, and
$10.00 to the other, filed probate proceedings, had
distribution made to him on the strength of the said
quitclaim deeds, and then brought the action to
quiet title on the land he had theretofore sold for a
valuable consideration.
Was his conduct in conformity with equity and
good conscience? Is his conduct not inconsistent
with the position previously taken? A suit to quiet
title being an equitable action, is he coming into
court with clean hands? Did his action in purchasing the property from the county and then selling it
for a valuable consideration not constitute an acquiescence under the doctrine of quasi estoppel? Is he
not .on the one hand retaining the price paid to him
for the land, and on the other, trying to get the same
land back on a technical rule of lavv?
Appellants have been unable to find but few
cases somewhat analogous to the one before the court.
The following general statement is found in Vol. 51
American Jurisprudence, page 979, Sec. 1137:
Estoppel to Deny Validity of Title.The principles of equitable estopple in pais
may be invoked against the owner of land
which has been sold for taxes when he seeks
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to attack the title of the purchaser at the tax
sale. Their application in a particular case is
determined by the general principles of estoppel. ... "
In the instant case, the Respondent was the purchaser at the tax sale, yet he himself is attacking his
own tax title.
In Ferguson vs.

Etter~

21 Ark. 160, 76 Am. Dec.

361,
At a sale for taxes, made by Sheriff, Nov.
3, 1851, complainants and Maddux, the testator, became the purchasers, to whom deed
"'as made, containing the usual recitals.
At time of sale, Maddux was in possession
under a lease from one Miller, who was the
former owner; and after the sale, continued in
possession until the day of his death, recognizing the validity of the sale and holding under it.
By will he devised his undivided interest,
his devisees being defendants in the bill.

The defense was that the sale for taxes
Lvas void and did not divest the title of Miller,
which the defendants allege is outstanding
and paramount.
Some of the objections relied on to impeach the
validity of the sale relate to the assessment of the lots,
others relating to the assessment for back taxes for
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a period anterior. to the formation of the State
Government.
The court held that,
Whether well taken or not, it is immaterial to inquire, as the defendants are estopped
to set them up .... it was lawful for Maddux
to become purchaser of the premises, and having become such purchaser jointly with complainants, and the deed of the Sheriff to him
and complainants, as tenants in common, being prime facie evidence of valid legal title,
and having held the premises under the tax
title thus acquired, and enjoyed the rents and
profits, he could not have been heard to set
up an outstanding title in a stranger, in order
to defeat a petition (to partition).
The case of Claybourne v. McLaughlin, 106 Mo.
521, 27 Am. St. R. 369, was an action in ejectment
to recover possession.
Answer: General denial, estoppel and latches
in bringing suit.
The estoppel plea: The property was sold for
delinquent taxes against plaintiff and purchased
by S. A. Wright, and that defendants are in pos..
session, and claim title under mesne conveyances
from him; that under the sale, there was a surplus of
$76.81 after payment of taxes, which plaintiff demanded and received, thus ratifying the sale.
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Defendants also alleged, in substance, that plaintiff with knowledge of all the facts, stood by for years
and saw defendants and grantors enter into possession, and make valuable improvements.
Some objections were made to the validity of the
(tax) sale and deed. The Court found for the defendants, holding,
"It is a well recognized principle of law
of estoppel that no person will be allowed to
adopt that part of the transaction which is
favorable to him, and reject the rest, to the
injury of those from whom he derives the
benefit, (citing Austin v. Loring, 63 Mo. 22).

"When a sale of land is made, no person
can be permitted both the money and the
land. And it has been held, in the application
of this principle, that it makes no difference
whether the proceedings under which the
sales occurs are voidable, or wholly void in
consequence of want of jurisdiction . . .. that
when those who are entitled to avoid a sale
adopt and ratify it, by receiving the whole
or any part of the purchase money, equity
will preclude them from setting it aside subsequently, for reasons that are too plain for
statement .... The principle which these cases
illustrate, and which is founded upon common honesty and good faith, is invoked in this
defense. While the delinquent taxes were
alien on this land, it was also an obligation
resting up plaintiff personally, which good
citizenship required them to discharge. This
they neglected to do. The land was sold to
satisfy the charge. . .
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To permit plaintiffs to affirm the sale,
and hold the proceeds in one hand, and reject
the sale, and take the land with the other
would be an encouragement of bad faith
which courts of equity will not allow.
Respondent was presumed to know the defect,
yet he sold what he knew to be a defective title for a
valuable consideration, pocketed that consideration,
put the buyer into possession, stood by for several
years, let the buyer from him pay the taxes, both
general and special, and then when the property had
increased in value, slipped around and bought up
for a nominal consideration the record title from the
ones who had neglected for twenty years to pay any
taxes (by reason of which he bought the title from
Salt Lake County), then after obtaining the record
title, brought an action to repudiate his former action
and repossess the land.

'

Appellants assert that this case may be determined, not by extensive citing of analagous casesthere being few to be found of similar import-but
by review of the agreed facts, and by the application
of plain principles of equity.
We therefore contend that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and that entry of
judgment for Appellants should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID A. WEST,
Attorney for Appellants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

